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ABSTRACT
This study uses computerized personnel microdata on the white male
managerial and professional employees in a major u.S. corporation to address
the following question: Can the additional earnings which are associated
with more labor market experience at a point in time really be explained
by higher productivity at the same point in time? Our answer to this
question, based on both cross-sectional and longitudinal information, is
that performance plays a substantially smaller role in explaining cross-
sectional experience-earnings differentials or earnings growth than is
claimed by those who have adopted the human capital explanation of the
experience-earnings profile. Since our response to the question under
analysis depends critically on our having assumed that the performance
ratingswhich supervisors give (individually or collectively) to their
white male managerial and professional subordinates adequately reflect the
subordinates' relative productivity in the year of assessment, we present
a great deal of evidence which very strongly supports this assumption.
Professor James L. Medoff
Katharine G. Abraham
National Bureau of Economic Research
1050 Massachusetts Avenue
Cambridge, Massachusetts 02138
(617) 868-3914The human capital explanation of the experience-earnings profile
has dominated most economists' thinking about why workers' relative
earnings increase with labor market experience. This theory has at its
heart the assumption that the observed growth in relative earnings reflects
growth in relative productivity, attributable to individuals' investment
in on-the-job training. Since there are numerous other plausible
explanations of why relative earnings grow with time on the job in which
relative productivity growth plays virtually no role, the superiority
of the human capital model over these alternatives must be established
by demonstrating that when relative earnings are growing with labor
market experienc~relative performance is growing as well. Despite the
widespread acceptance of the human capital model of the experience-earnings
profile and the straightforward nature of the experiment required to
empirically establish its superiority over alternative models in which
factors other than productivity growth determine earnings growth, no one
has ever provided evidence which demonstrates that experience-earnings
differentials can in fact be explained by experience-productivity differ-
entials. Thus, as is not atypical in economics, acceptance of the human
capital theory of why relative earnings grow with experience is based
solely on a priori logic.
The first experiments designed and conducted to ascertain the validity
of the human capital interpretation of experience-earnings differentials are
discussed in Medoff and Medoff and Abraham. These studies analyzed the
earnings and rated performance of white male managerial and professional
employees in three major U.S. corporations. They found that, among
employees doing comparable tasks, while greater experience typically was2
associated with substantially greater relative earnings it generally
was associated with no greater or lesser relative rated performance. Hence
the results of this experimentation lend no support to the human capital
model of productivity-augmenting on-the-job training or to any other theory
which attempts to explain experience-earnings differentials in terms of
1
experience-productivity differentials.
As would be hoped, the experimental design employed in our earlier
studies has elicited a fair amount of criticism. The two most fundamental
questions raised by our critics are: Do, as we assumed, the performance
ratings given subordinates by their supervisors each year adequately reflect
differences in the subordinates' current relative productivity? And, would our
conclusions have been very different if our analysis were based on
longitudinal data as opposed to the cross-sectional data employed?
The purpose of this study is to use a very rich body of personnel
data from a fourth company (hereafter referred to as Company C) to address these
two queries. In Section I, we discuss the nature of our experimental
design in greater detail, summarize the results presented in the two previous
pieces, and outline some potential criticisms of our methodology. We
describe the data drawn from Company CiS computerized data file and their
transformation for use in this analysis in Section II. The Company
C data are employed in Section III both to provide additional evidence
which supports our use of performance ratings as an index of relative
productivity and to demonstrate that our previous findings were not
artifacts produced by cross-sectional data sets. The final section
restates our major conclusion that, at least in the case of experience,
a very substantial fraction of observed earnings differentials does
not really reflect productivity differentials and discusses how we3
might begin developing an empirically-based explanation of what experience-
earnings differentials are really about.
I. The Experiment
In this section we first briefly layout the human capital explanation
of the upward-sloping experience-earnings profile. We then discuss the
design of the experiment used to test the explanation's validity and summarize
the results of our earlier experimentation. Finally we consider
criticisms of the experiment, some of which were anticipated and dealt
with in Medoff and in Medoff and Abraham and some of which will be addressed
for the first time in Section III.
The Belief to Be Tested
The human capital model of the age-earnings profile posits that the
upward sloping segments of an experience-earnings profile reflect on-
the-job training, which causes the corresponding segments of an underlying
2
experience-productivity profile to slope upwards. There are, however,
other potential explanations of the relationship between experience and
earnings in which productivity growth plays a very minor, if any, role.
For instance, Mincer (p. 80) recognizes the possibility that the positive
association between experience and earnings might only "reflect the prevalence
of institutional arrangements such as seniority provisions in employment
practices." He then makes an observation that implicitly describes the
nature of a seemingly good experiment for testing the human capital belief:
"Such practices, however, do not contradict the productivity-augmenting
hypothesis, unless it can be shown that growth of earnings under seniority
3
provisions is largely independent of productivity growth."
Thus the human capital interpretation of the experience-earnings
profile is distinguished from other interpretations by the prediction:4
earnings growth reflects productivity growth. Therefore it is possible
to falsify the theory by demonstrating that, over much of an employee's
work life, the corresponding pieces of experience-earnings and experience-
productivity profiles do not have the same sign.
Experimental Design
The primary problem in designing an experiment which could provide
evidence inconsistent with the human capital hypothesis is the measurement
of an individual's productivity. In our two earlier studies, this problem
was dealt with byassuming that the annual job performance ratings done by
immediate supervisors are valid indicators of the relative productivity in
the year covered by the appraisal of white male managerial and professional
employees engaged in comparable work (i.e., that an employee rated ahead of
X percent of his peers was, in the year of the rating, more productive than
X percent). Under this assumption, it was possible to compare, for a given
year, the relative earnings and relative productivity of employees in
similar jobs. In particular, we could assess whether at a stated point in
time the typical senior worker in a job received higher pay than a comparable jcunior
worker in a similar job because the senior worker had higher productivity.
Our first experimental design employed standard semilog earnings
functions to address the following three questions: 1. By how much does
the pay of more experienced managers and professionals exceed that of
otherwise comparable but less experienced managers and professionals?
2. Does a substantial part of the return to experience occur within grade
levels, where the availability of performance ratings permits inference
regarding the relative current productivity of more and less experienced managers
and professionals? 3. Within grade levels, can the higher earnings of more
experienced managers and professionals be explained by their current performance?
To answer the first question, we fit the following equation for each5
company's white male managers and professionals:
1) In(y) = a + SX + £,
with y equal to annual salary rate, the vector X capturing educational
attainment, pre-company experience and company service, a and S representing
parameters to be estimated and £ representing the equation error.
The estimated coefficients implied in each case that, at the appropriate
mean of the relevant experience variable, an additional year of pre-company
experience was associated with approximately one half of 1 percent higher
earnings and an additional year of company service with approximately 1
percent higher earnings.
Next, regressions similar to equation 1 but with grade level dummies
added on the right hand side were estimated for each of the three white
male managerial and professional samples. The results from this second
set of equations indicate that approximately 40 percent of the implied
return at the mean to an additional year of either pre-company experience
or company service occurred within grade level.
The finding that within-grade-level experience-related earnings
differentials are a substantial fraction of total experience-related
earnings differentials for white male managers and professionals at the
three companies studied was very important because the available information
on employee performance only permitted inference regarding the relative
productivity of managers and professionals in the same grade. In
each of the data sets employed, an overall performance rating awarded by
a superior '7as recorded for all managers and professionals who had been
on the job for at least four to six months. Superiors were expected to
base their ratings of each subordinate on the extent to which during the
year of appraisal that subordinate fulfilled the requirements of his or her6
job. Since companies group their managerial and professional jobs into
grade levels on the basis of the difficulty and importance of each job,
it seemed reasonable to assume that within a grade level white male
managers and professionals with high ratings were more productive in
the year covered by the rating than were white male managers and pro-
fessionals with lower ratings. However, no clear inference regarding
relative productivities could be drawn from the performance ratings of
persons in different grade levels.
One approach to ascertainin~whether performance mediated the
documented link between labor force experience and higher within-grade
earnings among white male managers and professionals was to add
performance rating dummies to the variables included on the right hand
side of the second set of semilog earnings function regressions (the
set with grade level dummies included). If more experienced people
received higher within-grade salaries in a year even in part because they were
more productive in that year, the introduction of performance rating dummies as
controls for relative within-grade productivity should have moved the
estimated within-grade return to experience towards zero. In no case did
this occur.
Another experimental design for examining the same set
of interrelationships entailed multinomial logit estimation of the
effect of labor force experience (and other personal characteristics)
on the probability of a white male manager or professional being at the
top, in the middle or at the bottom of the salary distribution for his
grade level and on the probability of a white male manager or professional
being at the top, in the middle or at the bottom of the performance
distribution for his grade level. The results of the multinomial logit
estimation implied in all cases that while an additional year of either7
pre-company experience or company service substantially and significantly
reduced the probability of a sample member with mean characteristics being
at the bottom of the relevant within-grade salary distribution, the same
year of either pre-company experience or company service increased or did
not affect the probability of a sample member with mean characteristics
being at the bottom of the relevant within-grade performance distribution.
Thus, results from three companies support the conclusion that at
least a substantial fraction of the higherintrafirm earnings associated
at a given point in time with additional labor force experience among
managers and professionals is unrelated to productivity at that same point
in time. Comparable cross-sectional results presented in Section III
below based on data from the fourth company we have called Company C
reinforce this basic conclusion.
Criticisms and Responses
One criticism of the basic cross-sectional result might start out
by noting that although four to six performance ratings were available to
supervisors at each of the three companies originally studied, in fact
at each of these enterprises most people received one of only two ratings so
that in effect only one cut in each within-grade performance distribution
was made. Thus, this line of argument might continue, although more
experienced employees were no more likely to be above than below the one
cut in the relevant performance distribution, within each of the two parts
of the performance distribution more experienced employees might be
uniformly more productive than otherwise comparable less experienced
employees. If such were the case, while introduction of crude performance
rating dummies into the semilog earnings function which controlled for grade level
would not produce any movement of the estimated within-grade return to8
expe~ience towards zero, introduction of finer performance measures would
lead to a substantial reduction in the estimated return to experience.
Better performance measures contained in the Company C data set permit the
exploration of this possibility. As discussed further in Section II of
this study, supervisors at Company C were required to follow a forced
distribution in awarding one of the six (beginning in 1976) or nine (prior to 1976)
possible ratings to each of their subordinates so that bunching of ratings
was not a problem. In addition, each employee was ranked annually by a
group of supervisors against a group of his colleagues, providing an even
more precise measure of relative performance. Results reported in Section III
below demonstrate that the use of these finer performance variables strengthens
the basic conclusion that, within grade levels at a given point in time,
higher earnings of more experienced white male managers and professionals
are unrelated to productivity.
Another approach to criticizing our basic finding might be to assert
that performance ratings are too flawed to offer any reliable information
4 about the relative productivity of workers within a grade. One commonly
cited problem with performance ratings is that most supervisors tend to be
overly lenient; hence, it is argued, ratings are inflated. This problem
is irrelevant for present purposes provided that leniency in rating does
not lead to a distortion of the relative position of employees. Further,
the performance measures available in the data set explored in this study
appear to be much less susceptible to charges of inflation than those
available in the original three data sets; the Company C ratings follow
a forced distribution and rankings are inherently immune to inflation.
Another potential problem with performance ratings is that different
supervisors might employ divergent standards of evaluation. Even if
divergences in individual supervisors' rating standards were typically9
substantial (available evidence suggests they may typically be small)
this source of variation in employee's rated performance could not explain
our results unless employees with different observed characteristics were
systematically paired with supervisors applying different sets of standards.5,6
We know of no evidence which indicates that a pairing of this nature would
be other than a very rare event.
Furthermore, variation in the standards applied in awarding the
Company C ratings and rankings should be minimal. Since (as stated above)
neither performance measure can be seriously inflated, variation in
leniency on the part of supervisors should not be a significant source
of variation in rating standards. The fact that both the ratings and
the rankings reflect a consensus reached by a group of supervisors rather
than just one person's opinion also argues against there being significant
variation in rating standards.
It is also possible that employee's personal characteristics
(race, sex, age, time with company) might influence supervisors' performance
assessments. We see no reason to conclude a priori and have seen no
evidence suggesting that supervisors discriminate against older or more
experienced employees in giving out performance ratings. In fact, available
evidence suggests that if there is any experience-related distortion in
performance ratings, it works in the direction of overstating the more
experienced person's true relative performance in the year of appraisal.?
Another possibility is that the rated performance of a group of more
experienced employees would most likely be an understatement of their true
relative productivity if their supervisor had greater expectations for them
as opposed to their less experienced grade-level compatriots and systematically
gave them more difficult assignments. It seems unlikely a priori that
supervisors will expect more of and give more difficult tasks to individuals10
in a given grade level with greater than average experience, since this
group of "stayers" can be expected to be less able. Evidence supporting
this claim was unearthed in a study (supported by the Harvard Business School)
of 2,500 engineers and managers at six technology-based companies done by
Dalton and Thompson. Their findings indicate a nontrivial (in absolute
value) negative relationship between supervisors' assessment of the com-
plexity of the tasks a subordinate engineer was typically asked to perform
and the subordinate's age. Two reasons why older engineers might be asked
to perform less complex tasks than younger engineers are, first, that the
typical older engineer is most likely less able than the typical younger
engineer since the more able members in any cohort of engineers tend to
be promoted to supervisory positions as they become older and, second, that
the skills possessed by the typical older engineer are likely to be some-
what obsolete. Similarly, one would expect that older managers in any
grade level might be asked to perform less complex tasks than otherwise
comparable younger managers in the same grade level because older managers
in any grade level are probably less able than younger managers in the same-
grade level having the same amount of education and because the skills of
older managers are probably somewhat obsolete.
Some readers of our earlier studies have asserted that we should seek
a "hard" or "objective" measure of the present value of the marginal revenue
product of each employee's current actions since it would clearly dominate
our "soft" or "subjective" performance rating or ranking. For this statement
to be correct, two thing would have to be true. First, the dimensions of
an employee's current true value to his or her firm would have to be
quantifiable. Second, either there would have to be only one relevant
dimension in assessing the employee's true worth or the researcher would
have to know the proper set of weights or shadow prices to attach to
each relevant dimension.11
Unfortunately, for the vast majority of occupations in an advanced
industrial society these two prerequisites will not hold. To see the nature
of the problem, consider the job of a secretary. No one quantifiable measure
(e.g., words typed per hour, phone calls answered per hour, etc.) would
adequately capture a secretary's true value to his or her employer. Moreover,
it is unlikely that all of the relevant dimensions of a secretary's value
marginal product are quantifiable. Furthermore, even if all of the relevant
factors could be quantified, we see little reason to believe that any set
of aggregation weights chosen by a researcher for -creating a single productivity
measure based on the various relevant factors would be better than those
implicitly chosen by the secretary's supervisor in awarding a performance
rating or ranking. Even for blue-collar jobs in which workers are paid
by the piece, deriving a satisfactory "hard" or "objective" measure of
current productivity is likely to be difficult. For instance, one tire
assembler might assemble, more tires than another tire assembler without
having any greater true current productivity by turning out a relatively
large number of flawed tires (which sneak by inspectors), being relatively
remiss in maintaining the machinery he or she uses, being relatively
wasteful of materials, or being less willing to assist his or her compatriots
than the typical assembler acting in a way consistent with long run profit
.. i 8 maxJ.mJ.zat on.
In the case of managerial and professional jobs, the problems of
deriving a "hard" or "objective" measure of relative value to the firm are
particularly complex. While the bottom line might at first blush appear to be
the current output to input ratio in the unit under an employee's supervision,
it is not at all obvious that this measure would dominate the performance
ratings and rankings employed in our analysis. This is because the current
output to input ratio can most likely be increased by utilizing capital
and subordinate labor in ways clearly inconsistent with long-run profit12
maximization. For this reason, most companies tell supervisors to consider
factors other thanshort-rununit success in doing their assessments of
subordinates' worth. For instance, at the airline analyzed in Medoff an
"Overall Evaluation" was to be based on "Subordinate Coaching" and "Teamwork"
in addition to "Unit Achievement," and currently at Company C the "Overall
Appraisal" is to be based on 20 factors in addition to "Quantity of Work", those
factors including "Quality of Work", "Resource Utilization", "Planning Effective-
ness", "Developing People", "Security Sensitivity", and "Safety Consciousness".
It seems most unlikely that a researcher could attach a better set of weights
to the various factors determining a manager or professional's value to his
company (e.g., a weight of one for "Unit Achievement" or "Quantity of
Work" and a weight of zero for all other factors) than those implicitly
assigned by the supervisors of jobs in rating or ranking the performance
of their subordinates. In sum, it is not at all obvious that researchers
can derive "hard" or "objective" indexes of relative true productive
value which will in fact dominate the index based on performance ratings
and rankings we used.
Substantiation of the validity of managerial and professional performance
ratings can be sought by assuming that, holding other personal characteristics
constant, firms should be more willing to promote and give larger raises to
more productive managers and professionals, and subsequently interpreting
evidence that managers and professionals with higher performance ratings are
significantly more likely to be promoted and receive larger raises as
supportive of the proposition that there must be a significant positive corre-
lation between measured performance and true relative productivity. Results
reported in the original Medoff and Medoff and Abraham studies demonstrate a
strong positive partial correlation (after controlling for education, experience,
grade level, and, in the salary increase equations, In(annual salary»
both between higher performance ratings and promotion in subsequent years13
and between higher performance ratings and percentage salary increases in
subsequent years. Replication of these promotion and percentage salary
increase experiments using the Company C data yields the same conclusions;
the results are reported in Section III.
While it is reasonable that performance ratings would be one
piece of information utilized by firms in making promotion decisions, there
would be cause for concern if performance ratings did not reflect solely
a manager or professional's productivity in his current job but also his
supervisor's assessment of his potential for advancement within the company.
Since, all else equal, more experienced (older) managers and professionals
are typically less likely to be promoted out of any given grade level than
less experienced (younger) managers and professionals and hence apt to
be perceived as having limited potential for future advancement, to the
extent that performance ratings are affected by supervisors' assessments
of individuals' future potential, more experienced workers might typically
receive lower performance ratings than warranted simply on the basis of
9
their current productivity.
The institutional basis for this argument is weak insofar as at all four
companies whose data have been analyzed the instructions to supervisors
preparing ratings clearly ask for an assessment of how well each employee
ia ful=illing the requirer1cnts of his or her current job, not for a
forecast of the employee's productivity profile over his or her work life.
At the airline studied in Medoff, the "Reviewer's Workbook" gave supervisors
the following instruction concerning the time period covered by their
appraisals: "Considering the specific performance evaluations on the
preceding pages, state below your overall evaluation of the manager's
performance over the past 12 months" [our italics]. At Company A
(discussed in Medoff and Abraham) supervisors are asked to make entries on14
a performance review worksheet "during the year for the purpose of providing
supporting information for the annual employee assessment" [our italics];
the intent is clearly that each employee's annual performance rating should
reflect his or her performance during the appraisal year. At Company B (also
discussed in Medoff and Abraham) the "Supervisor's Guide for Performance
Review and Development Planning" states that "[r]eviews should be based
on the employee's performance in his present position and only for the
period [typically one year] since his last review" [our italics]. At
Company C, as will be discussed below, the instructions to raters tell
them that "[e]ach employee should be rated on his current performance
and contributions based on requirements of his present assignment" and
that "career potential and promotability should not enter into ratings
of an individual's performance" [our italics].
It should also be pointed out that the Dalton and Thompson study of
age-earnings and age-performance differentials among engineers at six
companies, which provided evidence consistent with our findings, derived
performance rankingsby asking supervisors to assess the "contribution
made to the company during the past· year" [our italics] by their subordinates.
The Dalton and Thompson analysis was not based on ratings and rankings done
under companies' actual appraisal programs which would provide inputs into
salary growth or promotion decisions. Finally, it should be noted that at
many companies, including two of the four whose data we have analyzed, each
employee's promotability is formally assessed separately from his performance; at
Company C, for example, each employee's supervisor annually records the highest
grade level within the company which he or she believes the employee is likely to
attain. The results of statistical analysis presented in Section III imp1v
that the Company C performance ratings and the Company C potential measures
really do capture different things; while performance ratings do very much
better than potential ratings in explaining current salary, potential ratings15
strongly dominate in predicting promotions.
Some critics have accepted our assumption that performance ratings
adequately capture current relative productivity but have argued that
our basic finding is an artifact of the cross-sectional data employed
and would not be observed with longitudinal data. One possible story
about why this might be true assumes that at each of the companies studied
there had been a secular decrease in the share of the costs of firm
specific on-the-job training borne by employees. It would then be possible
(as is shown more formally in Section III) for longer service employees
to earn more and perform less well than shorter service employees without
contradicting the tenets of human capital theory. Adequate response to
this line of argument requires the presentation of longitudinal evidence
showing that at least some individuals have increasing. relative earnings
but decreasing relative productivity over time. Perhaps the most
important result reported in this study is the finding that at Company C
the relative within-grade earnings position of white male managers
and professionals remaining in the same grade level over a period of
years improves significantly and substantially with the passage of
time while the relative within-grade performance position of those
same managers and professionals deteriorates over the same time period.
Section III discusses this finding in detail.16
II. The Company Personnel File
All of the results reported in the next section of this paper are
based on information extracted from a computerized personnel file made
available to us by a large u.s. manufacturing corporation which we have
called Company C. The raw Company C data file consisted of five annual
segments, one for each year from 1973 through 1977, each segment
containing a record for every exempt employee who lvas "active" with the
company at any time during the given year. Each annual employee record
included information on the employee's education, length of company service,
date of birth, physical work location, current job grade, date of entry
into current job grade, current salary and recent salary increases; in addition,
it included two separate assessments of the employee's performance and an
assessment of the employee's potential for advancement within the company
prepared during the summer of the previous year (so that, for example, the
1973 records contained performance assessments and potential assessments
prepared during the summer of 1972). Under the assumptions that all
changes in grade level during 1973 were promotions from one grade level to
the next higher grade level, that no persons changed grade level more than
once during 1973, that the salary increase information on the 1973
records captured all salary changes made during 1973, and that no employee
changed educational status or physical work location during 1973, a
complete fix on each employee's year-end status (including demographic
information, grade level, salary and evaluations of performance and
potential received during the year) was constructed for each year from
1972 through 1976; similar data except for the performance and potential
evaluations were available for 1977.10
One further adjustment was needed to prepare the year-end data for17
analysis. Because the performance and potential evaluations done
each year were completed during the summer while each employee's grade
level was recorded as of year end, the grade levels originally present
on the annual employee records corresponded imperfectly to the grade levels
the employees were in at the time of their annual performance and .potentia1
reviews. To correct for this shortcoming in the data, it was assumed that
employees with a grade change date later than June 30 of the relevant
year had been evaluated prior to changing grade level. For these
employees, the grade level entered on the relevant annual record was
reduced by one to the next lower grade level. Whenever subsequent
reference is made to an employee's grade level, it is this adjusted grade
11
level which is indicated.
The populations for each year 1972 through 1976 on which all of the
subsequently discussed data transformations were based consisted of all
domestically based white males "active" with full time exempt status as
of the relevant year end and with (adjusted) grade level in the Company C
managerial and professional range for whom complete performance and year
12
end salary information for the relevant year was available. Those
included in the samples used for the experiments reported in Section III had
in addition to meet more restrictive information availability requirements
as dictated by each particular experiment.
The schooling information on the Company C file was used to categorize
population members in each of the years 1972 through 1976 by highest level
of educational attainment: less than high school, high school diploma,
bachelors degree, masters degree or doctorate. Pre-company experience
variables were computed to equal age as of each year end minus schooling
minus company service minus five. For this purpose, it was assumed that18
non-high school graduates had spent 10 years in school, high school
graduates 13 years, college graduates 16 years, masters degree holders
18 years and Ph.D.'s 21 years. Dummy variables were created which placed
each Company C physical work location in one of four regions: Northeast,
13
North Central, South or West~
Performance Rating and Ranking
At Company C, supervisors formally assess the performance of each
managerial or professional employee once a year. Two separate performance
measures are recorded: an overall performance rating and a ranking of
each employee relative to others in an appropriate comparison group.
Performance ratings are prepared initially by each employee's
immediate supervisor. The rating form in use during the period under
analysis gave supervisors the following instructions:
Each employee should be rated on current performance and contributions
based on requirements of his present assignment. An employee should
be measured both as to his contributions in terms of the standards
of his job and against others performing similar work at similar
levels. Career potential and promotability should not enter into
ratings of an individual's performance.
Prior to 1976, the overall rating scale comprised nine categories;
beginning in 1976, the number of appraisal categories was cut to six
by merging the top two categories and merging the bottom three categories
from the old rating scale.
In addition to rating the performance of each subordinate, supervisors
at Company C are required to rank each employee relative to a group of
his peers. Management provides each supervisor in a department or other19
appropriate organizational unit with a list of employees doing reasonably
comparable levels of work~4The supervisor is first told to strike off
the list employees "whose work you do not know well" or "whose work in your
opinion is so different from most of the others that you do not think
he (or she) can be compared with them" and then instructed to rank the
remaining people. The ranking is done by first picking the best employee
on the list, then picking the worst employee on the list, next designating
the best employee of those remaining on the list, and then designating the worst
employee of those remaining on the list, and so on until all of the
employees have been ranked. The same criteria used in assigning the
performance ratings underlie the rankings. That is, employees
are ranked on the basis of how well each is meeting the requirements of
his or her own particular assignment compared to how well others are
meeting the requirements of their assignments. Rank group lists are
designed to be as large as practicable, with as many supervisors as
possible serving as rankers for each group consistent with their having
adequate knowledge of the employees being ranked.
After all of the supervisors at a given level of the corporate
hierarchy have assigned performance ratings to their subordinates and
ranked those employees whose work they are qualified to assess, the rating
and ranking forms are reviewed by managers at the next level of the
corporate hierarchy. Any major disparities among rankers are reconciled
and a consensus is reached regarding each employee's position in his or
her ranking group.
Finally, the performance ratings made by the immediate supervisors
may be modified so that they are consistent with the consensus rankings
and so that the overall distribution of ratings within the ranking
group is reasonably consistent with the company's expected performance20
distribution. In 1976, for example, the enunciated goal was that no
more than 10 percent of all employees rated should receive the highest
possible rating, approximately 25 percent should receive each of the next
three ratings and approximately 15 percent should receive one or the
other of the bottom ratings. In all years, the actual distribution of
ratings ultimately given closely matched the desired distribution. In 1976,
to continue our example, the actual proportions of those included in our
population versus the desired proportions of employees receiving each rating were
(from top to bottom) as follows: 9 percent versus 10 percent; 25 percent
versus 25 percent; 26 percent versus 25 percent; 25 percent versus 25
percent; and (for the bottom two rating categories combined) 15 percent
versus 15 percent.
As noted above, both performance rating and ranking are designed
to measure an employee's performance relative to "the total requirements
and standards of the job." According to a manual describing their
salary system which we received from Company C:
Every management and professional position at [the Company]
is assigned to a classification level which is determined
by an evaluation of the job and a measurement of the value
of that job relative to other jobs in the Company. Thus
positions of similar value are placed in the same classification
level.
Given the way jobs are assigned to grade levels at Company C, we felt
comfortable assuming that within a given grade level those with high
performance ratings or high rankings were more productive than those
with low performance ratings or low rankings.
For some experiments, sets of dummy variables were constructed
from the recorded performance ratings. For other experiments, the
recorded performance ratings were transformed into variables reflecting
percentile position in the relevant within-grade performance distribution.21
One rating percentile variable (P) was calculated based on the 1976
population using the formula P = F/2 for persons with any of the bottom
three performance ratings in 1976 and the formula P = F + (1 - F)/2
for persons with any of the top three performance ratings in 1974 where
F represents the proportion of 1976 population members in the relevant
grade level who were given anyone of the bottom three performance
ratings in 1976. Five more refined rating percentile variables (p')
were calculated, one set for each of the years 1972 through 1976, using the
formula P' = F(i-l) + [F(i) - F(i-l)]/2,where F(i-l) represents the
fraction of the relevant year's population members in the appropriate
grade level with a rating in the given year of i-lor below; F(i)
represents the fraction of the same group with a rating in the given year
of i or below; and i represents the rating received in the given year by the
individual for whom P' is being calculated, with i having possible values
of one (worst) through nine (best) in 1972 through 1975 and possible
values of one (worst) through six (best) in 1976.
The raw ranking information for each of the years 1972
through 1976 was transformed into continuous ranking percentile
variables (R) using the formula R=(N-Q+l/2)/N,where Q represents the
individual's rank within the relevant comparison group in the given year
and N represents the number of people against whom the individual was
ranked in the given year. Ranking percentile variables with a limited
number of possible values (R') were created for each of the years
1972 through 1976 for use in those experiments where both a ranking variable
and an analagous salary variable were required. Where R was between zero
and .10, R' was set equal to .05; where R was between .10 and .20, R'
was set equal to .15; and so on.22
Salary Variables
A salary variable (SP) analagous to the 1976 two category (low or
high) rating percentile variable (and also based on the 1976 population)
was constructed by cutting each year-end within-grade salary distribution
at the cumulative frequency corresponding to the proportion of 1976
population members in the relevant grade level with anyone of the bottom
three ratings, then setting SP=F/2 for those individuals with salaries
at the end of 1976 below the cut and setting SP=F+(1-F)/2 for those individuals
with salaries at the end of 1976 above the cut, where F again represents
the proportion of 1976 population members in the relevant grade level with
anyone of the bottom three performance ratings in 1976.
Five salary variables (SP') analagous to each of the more refined
rating percentile variables (and also based on the 1972 through 1976
populations) were constructed by cutting each year-end within-grade
salary distribution at the cumulative frequences corresponding to the
proportions of the relevant year's population members in the appropriate
grade level with the given rating or a worse rating in the given year,
then, dependfng on the individual's year-end salary and grade level in the
relevant year, setting SP'=F(i-1)+[F(i)-F(i-1)]/2,where F(i) represents
the cumulative proportion of the relevant year's population members in
the appropriate grade level with year-end salaries at or below the cut
closest above the individual's salary and F(i-1) represents the cumulative
proportion of the same group with year-end salaries at or below the cut
closest below the individual's salary.
:or comparability with thc R' ranking j"'crccnti1c variah1cG. a Gct
of salary variables (SR') (also based on the 1972 through 1976 populations)
were calculated. To do this, each relevant year-end within-grade salary23
distribution was divided into dec11es; individuals with salaries
at the end of the relevant year in the first decile were given a percentile
score SR' equal to .05, individuals with salaries at the end of the
relevant year in the second decile were given a percentile score SR'
equal to .15, etcetera.
To summarize, for each individual for whom the requisite raw rating,
raw ranking and raw year-end annual dollar salary figures were available,
the following transformed variables were created: 1. Sets of performance
rating dummies; 2. A two category (low or high) 1976 rating percentile
variable and an analagous two category 1976 salary percentile variable;
3. A more refined rating percentile variable and an analagous salary
percentile variable for each year 1972 through 1976; 4. A continuous ranking
percentile variable for each year 1972 through 1976; and 5. A ranking
decile variable and an analagous salary decile variable for each year
1972 through 1976.
Rated Potential
In addition to evaluating the current performance of each employee
and awarding performance ratings and rankings, supervisors at Company C
were required to perform an annual assessment of each employee's potential
for advancement within the Company. Based on consideration of such factors
as quality of performance, capacity to learn, judgement and motivation,
supervisors were first asked to give one or more examples of the highest
level of job which each employee had the potential ability to achieve.
Next, supervisors were requested to consider whether such factors as an
employee's preference for a particular type of work or an employee's
health would hold the employee back, have no effect, or help the employee
achieve full potential. Finally, having considered both of the above sets24
of factors, supervisors were asked to record the grade of the highest level
of job which each employee could realistically be expected to achieve during
the course of his career.25
III. Basic Results and Responses to Criticisms
In analyzing the Company C personnel data, our first question was,
controlling for level of educational attainment and region, how large are the
earnings differentials between managers and professionals with different
amounts of labor force experience? The first regression in Table 1
indicates that at the mean of the relevant variables, an additional year
of pre-company experience is associated with a small but significant positive
increment to earnings and an additional year of company service is associated
with somewhat more than a 1 percent increment to earnings. The regression
coefficients imply that, all else equal, a person with one standard
deviation more than the mean number of years of pre-company experience
would earn 3 percent more than a person with no pre-company experience
and that a person with one standard deviation more than the mean number
of years of company service would earn 29 percent more than a person with
one standard deviation less.
Next we asked whether a substantial fraction of the higher earnings
associated with additional labor force experience occurred within, grade
leveJs rather than as a result of more experienced managers and professionals
holding jobs in grade levels with higher than averag~salaries. To answer
this question, we added grade level dummies to the controls present in
the first model to get model 2 and calculated the fraction of the total
return to experience they captured. The results of this procedure imply that
all of the return at the mean to an additional year of pre-conpany experience
occurs within grade level and that 42 percent of the return at the mean
to an additional year of company service occurs within grade; a person
with one standard deviation more than the mean number of years of pre-
company experience would earn 4 percent more than an otherwise comparableTable 1: Influence of Education, Experience and Performance
on Managerial and Professional Earnings/~




[S .D. ] (1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
Less than High School .021 -.281 -.056 -.066 -.069 -.070
Diploma (yes = 1) [.143] (.017) (.006) (.006) (.006) (.006)
High School Diploma .343 -.204 -.015' -.025 -.030 -.030
(yes = 1) [.475] (.006) (.002) (.002) (.002) (.002)
Masters Degree .145 .104 .025 .025 .026 .025
(yes = 1) [.352] ( .007) (.003) (.003) (.002) (.002)
Doctorate (yes = 1) .043 .238 .052 .055 .057 .056
[.203] (.012) (.004) (.004) (.004) . (.004)
Years of Pre-Company .521 -.019 .035 .047 .054 .052
Experience/10 [.532) (.010) (.004) (.004) (.004) (.004)
(Years of Pre-Company .554 .030 .003 .002 .002 .002
Experience)2/100 [1.247] (.004) (.002) (.001) (.001) (.001)
Years of Company 1.946 .323 .110 .115 .119 .117
Service/10 [1.125) (.008) (.003) (.003) (.003) (.003)
(Years of Company 5.053 -.050 -.014 -.014 -.013 -.013
Service)2/100 [4.504] (.002) (.001) (.001) (.001) (.001)
Performance Rating 1 .011 -.116
(Worst; yes = 1) [.102] (.008)
Performance Rating 2 .137 -.083
(yes = 1) [.344] (.003)
Performance Rating 3 .253 -.045
(yes = 1) [.435] (.002)
Performance Rating 4 .258 -.027
(yes = 1) [.437] (.002)
Performance Rating 6 .092 .032
(Best; yes = 1) [.289] (.003)
Performance Rating .400 -.050
1-3 (yes = 1) [.490] (.002)
(No. Ranked - Rank + .504 .109
1/2)/No. Ranked [.289] (.003)
Constant yes yes yes yes yes
Region Dummies (3) yes yes yes yes yes
Grade Dummies (11) no yes yes yes yes
°R2 .376 .913 .921 .926 .925
SEE .204 .076 .073 .070 .071
Notes: /a in parentheses below coefficient estimates. - Standard errors are enclosed
Ib - Mean [S.D.] = 10.156 [.258].27
individual in the same grade level with no pre-company experience and a
person with one standard deviation more than the mean number of years of
company service would earn 12 percent more than an otherwise comparable
individual in the same grade level with one standard deviation less.
lS
Having established the existence of substantial within-grade returns
to pre-company experience and to company service among managers and
professionals at Company C, our third question was whether the higher
within-grade earnings of more experienced employees were justified
in terms of their higher relative within-grade productivity. If more
experienced employees in a grade level in fact tended to receive higher
salaries because they were typically more productive, one would expect
the introduction of variables capturing relative within-grade performance
into the In(annual salary) regression to move the estimated within-grade
returns to experience towards zero.
Formally, suppose that experience were one of the things having a
positive impact on relative within-grade productivity:
where P represents relative within-grade productivity, Xl represents
experience, ~2 represents a vector containing educational attainment
dummies, region dummies and grade level dummies, ~3 represents additional
factors which affect productivity, the S's represent parameters, and E
represents the equation error. In a standard earnings function:
where Y represents annual salary, the S's represent parameters and ~
represents the equation error, the experience variable typically has a
significant positive coefficient. If, however, more experienced persons
within a grade earn more solely because they are more productive, when28
a measure of relative within-grade productivity is introduced into the
earnings function:
where the a's represent parameters and Y is the error term, the estimated
coefficient on the experience variable should fall to zero. According
to this model, the expected value of the estimated coefficient on experience
in equation (3) should be:
5) bpX .X (1,3'
1 _2 .
where bpX .x represents the coefficient on experience obtained from the
1 _1-
auxiliary repression of relative within-grade productivity on experience
and the ~2 variables. Once productivity is controlled for, experience




equation (4) should equal zero.
Regression 3 contains a performance dummy which is equal to 1 if
the employee received anyone of the top three performance ratings in
1976 and equal to 0 .otherwise; introducing this dummy should capture
relative performance with a degree of precision close to that obtained
in the comparable experiments reported in Medoff and in Medoff and Abraham,
since at each of the three companies whose data were analyzed in those
studies between85 and 95 percent of the sample members received one of
only two ratings. Contrary to what would be predicted by the human
capital model of experience-earnings differentials, controlling for whether
a manager or professional did or did not receive one of the top three
performance ratings actually increases the estimated within-grade return
to both pre-company experience and company service (although not by a
statistically significant amount).
This finding is susceptible to the criticism that the higher29
within-grade earnings of more experienced employees could still be
explicable on the basis of their higher relative within-grade productivity
since it could be the case that within each of the two large performance
categories captured by the crude performance dummies the more experienced
employees were the best performers. However, the introduction of finer
controls for relative within-grade productivity, five performance rating
dummies in regression 4 and percentile rank in regression 5, produces
results which strongly suggest that this criticism has little validity;
rather than moving the estimated return to experience towards zero,
replacement of the crude performance dummy with either of the more precise
measures of relative within-grade performance actually moves the
estimated return to both pre-company experience and company service even
17 18 further away from zero (although not by a statistically significant amount). '
An Alternative Experimental Design
Table 2 offers an alternative approach to untangling the inter-
relationship of experience, relative within-grade performance and relative
within-grade earnings among managers and professionals at Company C. Three
measures of each employee's 1976 within-grade performance (columns 1, 3 and 5)
and three comparable measures of each employee's 1976 within-grade salary
percentile position (columns 2, 4 and 6) are regressed on a right hand
side vector which contains educational attainment dummies, pre-company
experience and its square, company service and its square, region dummies,
and grade level dummies. Provided that all employees in each grade
level had borne the same proportiQnof the costs of their on-the-job
training, standard human capital theory implies that the within-grade orderin~
of employees by performance as of any point in time should be the same
as the within-grade rank ordering of employees by salary as of the sameTable 2: Influence of Education and Experience on the Within-Grade Performance Pe~centile and
/a Salary Percentile Position of Managers and Professionals -
(N = 8,238)
Dependent Dependent Variable Dependent Dependent Variable Dependent Dependent Va-
Variable .. 2 1976 Salary Vari- Variable '" .. 1976 Salary Vari- Variable '" riable .. 1976
1976 Two- able Corresponding 1976 Six- able Corresponding 1976 Salary Variable
Category Ra- to Two-Category Category Ra- to Six-Category Ranking Corresponding
ting Percen-/ Rating perce?tile ting Percen-/bRating Perce?tile Decile/!!. to Ranking /
tile Variable ~ Variable ~ tile Variable - Variable _ Variable Decile Variable !!.
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Mean [Standard .501 .548 .501 .502 .502 .502 Deviation] of [.243] [.235] [.281] [.280] [.287] [.287]
Dependent Variable
Less than High School .100 -.108 .120 -.179 .136 -.189 Diploma (yes '" 1) (.019) (.016) (.021) (.019) (.022) (.020)
High School Diploma .104 -.033 .128 -.058 .135 -.059 (yes .. 1) (.007) (.006) (.008) (.007) (.008) (.007)
Masters Degree -.003 .050 -.006 .057 .001 .056 (yes'" 1) (.008) (.007) (.009) (.008) (.009) (.008)
Doctorate (yes '" 1) -.025 .116 -.036 .147 -.031 .148
(.013) (.011) (.015) (.014) (.015) (.014)
Years of Pre-Company -.123 .072 -.160 .103 -.158 .107
Experience/10 (.011) (.010) (.013) (.012) (.013) (.013)
(Years of Pre-Company .011 .006 .015 .009 .016 .009 Experience)2/10q (.005) (.004) (.005) (.005) (.005) (.005)
Years of Company -.051 .229 -.076 .258 -.063 .268
Service/10 (.010) (.008) (.011) (.010) (.011) (.010)
(Years of 20mpany -.009 -.031 -.009 -.027 ~.012 -.028
Service) 1100 (.002) (.002) (.003) (.002) (.003) (.002)
Constant yes yes yes yes yes yes
Region Dummies (3) yes yes yes yes yes yes
Grade Dummies (11) yes yes yes yes yes yes
R2 .123 .333 .158 .302 .160 .314
5F.E .228 .192 .258 .235 .264 .238
w o
Notes:
/s - Standard errors are enclosed in parentheses below coefficient estimates.
1£ The procedure used to construct the dependent variables is detailed in Section II of the text.31
date. Hence, the estimated pre-company experience and company service
coefficients in each Table Z performance equation should equal the
estimated pre-company experience and company service coefficients in
the corresponding Table Z salary equation.
This argument holds even if important factors are omitted from the
list of explanatory variables included in the Table Z regressions. Suppose,
for example, that innate ability exerts an important influence on a manager
or professional's relative within-grade productivity:
6) P = B0 + B1Xl + ~ Z~Z + B3A + £,
where P represents within-grade performance percentile, Xl represents
experience, lCz represents a vector cont;:i.~ning educational attainment
dummies. region dummies and grade level dummies, A represents uncaptured
individual-specific differences, say in innate ability, which do not change
over time, the B's represent coefficients to be estimated and £ represents
the equation error. Let relative earnings be a function of the same variables:
7) S
where S represents within-grade percentile earnings position, the 8's
represent coefficients to be estimated, ~' represents the equation error,
and Xl' ~Z and A are as in equation 6. If no measure of ability is
available so that A is omitted both from the performance equation and








regression of ability on experience and the ~2 variables. If the rankA A
of Sl and 81, Sl - 81 would be an unbiased
32
ordering of employees by performance within each grade level were in
fact equal to the rank ordering of employees by salary within each
"-
grade level, Sl would equal 81 and S3 would equal 8
3
, so that a l
'A
would equal 81
. Furthermore, if unobserved ability were to affect
performance position and salary position in the same way(S3 equal to
8
3
) but experience were to have a different effect on relative perform-
A
ance than on relative salary (Sl not equal to 81), even though Sl and
A
8
1 would be biased estimators
. 19 20 est1mator of Sl - 81 . '
Examination of the Table 2 regressions quickly reveals that the
experience coefficients in the performance regressions differ greatly from
the experience coefficients in the corresponding'earnings regressions.
Regressions 1 and 2 imply that, at the mean of the relevant variables,
an additional year of pre-company experience is associated with a 1 point
reduction in within-grade performance percentile but with a 1 point
increase in within-grape salary percentile (a divergence of 2 points) and
that an additional year of company service is also associated with a
1 point reduction in within-grade performance percentile and a 1 point
increase in within-grade salary percentile (a divergence of 2 points).
One might argue that the use of dependent variables constructed by
making one cut in each within-grade performance distribution and in each
within-grade salary distribution as is done in regressions 1 and 2
could produce misleading results; if more experienced employees in each
grade level tended to be towards the top within either or both of the two
performance categories and/or towards the bottom within either or both
of the two salary categories on which the regression 1 and regression 2
percentile variables were based, the divergence between performance and
salary estimated to be associated with additional years of both pre-33
company experience and company sarvice could be seriously overstated.
However, the results of comparable regressions with dependent variables
based on six cuts (regressions 3 and 4) and ten cuts (regressions 5 arid
6) in each within-grade performance distribution and in each within-grade
salary distribution indicate that using more than two cuts in each
relevant distribution actually enhances both the estimated negative effect
of experience on within-grade performance percentile and the estimated
positive effect of experience on within-grade salary percentile.
Regressions 3 and 4 imply that for an employee with the mean amount of
both pre-company experience and company service, an additional year
of either pre-company experience or company service is associated with
a 3 point divergence between performance percentile and salary percentile;
regressions 5 and 6 imply a 3 point divergence associated with an
additional year of pre-company experience at the mean and a 2 point
divergence associated with an additional year of company service at
the mean. It appears unarguable that the cross sectional relationship
between labor force experience and relative within-grade performance
differs substantially from the cross sectional relationship between labor
. 21 22 force experience and relative within-grade earn1ngs.'
On the Nature of Performance Ratings
The finding that experience bears a different partial re1ationsip
to performance percentile than to salary percentile could conceivably be
the result of the performance measures not accurately capturing true
relative productivity in the year of appraisal. Possible problems with
performance measures which might lead to distorted representation of the
relative productivity of employees in a grade level include leniency in
evaluations, divergent standards of evaluation on the part of different
supervisors and age discrimination in awarding evaluations. These potentially
worrisome flaws were discussed in Section I and dismissed as unlikely to be34
the cause of any significant experience-related bias in the performance
ratings and rankings used in this paper.
It seems probable that, all else equal, those managers and professionals
who are relatively more productive in their current jobs should typically
be viewed as more likely to succeed in a higher level job than those who
are relatively less productive in their current jobs; additionally,
among the group of employees in any grade level who are perceived by
their supervisors as likely ultimately to reach any given higher grade
level those with the highest productivity at a given point in time would
typically be the most likely to be promoted at that point in time or in
the near future. Thus, high productivity employees in any grade level
should have a higher probability of receiving a promotion than otherwise
comparable low productivity employees in the same grade. Similarly, it
seems probable that, controlling for a list of other factors including
current rate of compensation, those employees in any grade level who are
most productive would receive larger salary increases than employees in
the same grade level who are less productive.
One method of assessing whether the Company C performance ratings
and rankings really reflect employees' relative within-grade productivity
is first to assume that, controlling for other factors, in particular
seniority, the company is indeed more likely to promote and give larger raises
to more productive employees in a given grade level, and subsequently to interpret
strong positive partial relationships between measured performance and probability
of promotion and between measured performance and size of raise as good evidence
that the Company C performance measures are significantly correlated with
true relative within-grade current productivity. Table 3 presents results
which indicate that Company C employees with high performance ratings are in
fact more likely to be promoted and do tend to receive larger salary35
increases than those receiving lower performance ratings. 23 Equation 1
indicates that, holding education, pre-company experience, company service,
region, and grade level constant, employees who received either of the top
two performance ratings in 1973 were significantly and substantially more
likely to have been promoted between year-end 1973 and year-end 1974 than
those who received any of the lower performance ratings while those who
received any of the bottom five performance ratings in 1973 were significantly
and substantially less likely to have been promoted between year-end 1973
and year-end 1974 than those who received any of the higher performance
ratings. A similar statement based on equation 2 can be made regarding
the partial relationship between 1973 performance rating and likelihood
of having been promoted between year-end 1974 and year-end 1977.
Equation 3 demonstrates the existence of an almost perfectly-monotonic
partialrelationship between 1973 performance rating and size of percentage
increase in salary received during calendar year 1974. The point estimates
of the coefficients imply that (with the exception of the difference
between the percentage salary increase associated wrth receiving the second
lowest performance rating and the percentage salary increase associated
with receiving the bottom performance rating), holding constant education,
pre-company experience, company service, region, grade level and In(annual
salary) as of the end of 1973, receiving any given rating rather than the
next lower rating was associated with roughly a two point increment to
an employee's percentage increase in sa1ary.24 According to the equation
4 results, persons who received either of the top two performance ratings
in 1973 tended to receive larger cumulative percentage increases in salary
between year-end 1974 and year-end 1977 than those who received any of
the lower performance ratings, while those who received any of the bottom
five performance ratings in 1973 tended to receive smaller cumulativeTable 3: Estimates of the Effect of Schooling, Experience and 36
Performance Rating on the Probability of Being Promoted and
on Percentage Salary lncreases/~
(Percent (Percent
Dependent Variable Dependent Variable SaI;ny In- Salar: In-
.. 1 if Promoted = 1 if Promoted crease)/II)O; crease)/l,)');
Between Year-end Between Year-end Year-end 1973 Year-end 1'17/0
1973 and Year-end 1974 and Year-end to to
1974, 0 Othe1wise 1977, OOthe1wise Year-end 1974 Year-enri ](\77
(N = 5,575) ~ (N .. 5,606) ~ (N = 5,606)/.£ (N = 5,606)/12.
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Mean [Standard Devia- .182 .364 .194 .243
tion] of Dependent [.057] [.091]
Variable
Less than High School -1.389 .025 -.006 .017
Diploma (yes = 1) (.484) (.244) (.005) (.008)
High School Diploma -.543 -.225 -.007 .003
(yes = 1) (.108) (.084) (.002) (.003)
Masters Degree .264 .180 .007 -.003
(yes = 1) (.113) (.099) (.002) (.004)
Doctorate (yes = 1) .459 .360 .015 -.011
(.192) (.172) (.004) (.006)
Years of Pre-Company -.430 -.440 .014 -.015
Experience/IO (.183) (.150) (.003) (.005)
(Years of Pre-Company .145 .028 -.001 -.002
Experience)2/100 (.087) (.072) (.001) (.003)
Years of Company -.510 -.926 .006 -.061
Service/IO (.168) (.139) (.003) (.005)
(Years of Company .065 .114 .002 .010
Service)2/100 (.047) (.037) (.001) (.001)
In(Annual Salary) -.356 -.169
(.008) (.013)
Performance Rating/I -.084 -.038
(Worst; yes = 1) £ (.045) (.079)
Performance Rating 2 -.092 -.041
(yes = 1) (.006) (.011)
Performance Rating/ -.866 -.594
1 or 2 (yes = 1) i (.424) (.320)
Performance Rating 3 -1.449 -.850 -.069 -.044
(yes = 1) (.174) (.119) (.002) (.004)
Performance Rating 4 -1.078 -.462 -.036 -.042
(yes = 1) (.122) (.092) (.002) .( .003).
Performance Rating 5 -.587 -.345 -.026 -.018
(yes = 1) (.095) (.080) (.002) (..003)
Performance Rating 7 .516 .159 .025 .007
(yes = 1) (.118) (.112) (.002) (.004)
Performance Rating 8 1.018 .746 .042 .041
(Best; yes = 1) (.398) (.406) (.008) (.014)
Region Dummies (3) yes yes yes yes
Grade Dummies (11/~ yes yes yes yes
l 709.60 878.77




/~ Standard errors are enclosed in parentheses below coefficient estimates.
/l Equations 1 and 2 were estimated using a maximum likelihood logit procedure,
equations 3 and 4 using OLS. All the values of the independent variables
in all four equations are as of December 1973.
/~ No one who received the lowest of the nine possible ratings in 1973 was
still with the company at the end of 1977; thus performance rating 1 is
actually the second lowest possible rating.
/A Since no one who received performance rating 1 in 1973 was promoted between
year-end 1973 and year-end 1977, the performance rating 1 and performance
rating 2 groups were merged in estimating the logit equations.
/~ Individuals in one grade where no one received a promotion between year-end
1973 and year-end 1974 were excluded from the equation 1 sample.38
percentage increases in salary between year-end 1974 and year-end 1977
than those receiving any of the higher ratings.
Current Productivity or Potential?
Doubters might still argue that, rather than measuring just a manager
or professional's current productivity, performance ratings could also be
partially dependent upon a person's potential for advancement with the
company. As the results discussed previously imply, holding schooling, region
and grade level constant, employees with more seniority and pre-company
experience generally have a lower probability of advancing in the corporate
hierarchy than employees with less; this reflects within-grade heterogeneity
in innate ability to handle a higher level job, "state dependence", and
other factors which cause the probability of promotion in period t to
be positively related to the frequency with which that event has occurred
. 25 in previous per10ds. For whatever reason, the fact that more experienced
(older) employees in any given grade level typically are less likely to
be promoted than less experienced (younger) employees in the same grade
level implies that if performance ratings were a function of both like-
lihood of advancement and current productivity, the performance ratings
of more experienced (older) employees might typically provide a downward
biased mnasure of their true relative productivity in the year of appraisal.
Given that at Company C supervisors are asked to provide separate
assessments of each employee's current performance and potential for
advancement, and given that, as stated above, they are told in
doing their performance evaluations that "career potential and promota-
bility should not enter into ratings of an individual's performance,"
it seems implausible that supervisors' performance assessments would be
reflecting promotability. If a supervisor wished to communicate to39
higher management .that a particular employee would do well in a higher
level job, the message would not have to be conveyed indirectly by
awarding the employee a higher-than-deserved performance rating but
could be conveyed directly by giving him a high potential score, which
is most certainly the way Company C seems to want this information trans-
mitted. The equation estimates presented in Table 4 lend strong support
to the belief that the performance ratings and the potential measure
mirror very different things, with the former reflecting the level of an
employee's relative productivity in his current assignment and the latter
the extent to which the employee is likely to advance in the Company C
hierarchy.
Equations 1 through 3 allow us to examine the partial effects (holding
education, pre-company experience, company service and grade-level
constant) of 1976 performance (equation 1), 1976 potential (equation 2)
and 1976 performance plus 1976 potential (equation 3) on the probability
of an employee being promoted between year-end 1976 and year-end 1977. 26
The results obtained indicate that performance makes a significant contri-
bution to explaining probability of promotion when added to the promotion
equation with potential already present and that potential makes a significant
contribution to explaining probability of promotion when added to the
promotion equation with performance already present. By using the
logit analogue to the multiple-correlation coefficient in the linear
statistical model (p2) presented and discussed in McFadden, we. can
ascertain the relative explanatory contributions of the potential and
27 2
performance measures. It turns out the change in p associated with
the potential variable is more than twice as large as the change in p2
associated with the performance dummies. Thus, as would most likely be
expected if the potential variable were directly capturing. likely future
success while the performance ratings were capturing current level ofTable 4: Current Performance versus PotentiaI/~ 40
-.475 -.135 -.315
(.368) (.365) (.368)
Dependent Variable = 1 if Pro-
moted Between Year-end 1976
and Year-end 1977, 0 Otherwise
(N = 7,567) /E..
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d.y. 27 23 28
Notes: /~ Standard errors are enclosed in parentheses below coefficient estimates.
/E.. Equations 1, 2 and 3 were estimated using a maximum likelihood logit pro-
cedure; equations 4, 5 and 6 usi.ng OLS. The mean of the dependent variable
in the logit equotions is .151; the mean [standard deviation] of the de-
pendent variable in the OL5 equations is 10.156 [.258]. All values of
the independent variables in all six equations are as of December 1976.
/c - Mean [S.D.] = 10.320 [.318].41
relative productivity, the potential variable plays a much more important
role in explaining promotions than do the performance rating dummies.
The coefficient estimates obtained in equations 4 through 6 reveal
the partial effects (holding education, pre-company experience, company
service and grade level and region constant) of 1976 performance (equation 4),
1976 potential (equation 5 ) and 1976 performance plus 1976 potential
(equation 6) on In(annual salary as of December 1976). While the performance
rating dummies make a highly significant incremental contribution to R2
when added to the equation with the potential variable already present, the
potential variable does not make a significant incremental contribution to
?
R- when added to the equation with the performance rating dummies already
present. This is exactly what would be expected if the performance ratings
were reflecting current productivity and the potential variable were re-
flecting likely future value to th~,company and if., holding demographic
characteristics, in particular company service, constant, salary decisions were
influenced by employees' current productivity much more than by their
I f d · i 28 ikely uture pro uctIV ty.
Longitudinal Evidence
It must be conceded that the cross-sectional results presented above
and in Medoff and Medoff and Abraham could be arguably consistent with
the tenets of human capital theory. While many economists might initially
be surprised by the finding that more experienced managers and professionals
tend to earn relatively more and perform relatively worse than less
experienced managers and professionals in the same grade level, the alert
human capital theorist would undoubtedly be able to respond with a quick
defensive parry. In particular, if the share of on-the-job training
costs borne by longer tenure employees in any grade level were significantly
above the share of on-the-job training costs borne by shorter tenure
employees in the same grade level, the observed cross-sectional pattern42
might be produced even though each individual employee were being compensated
in accordance with what human capital theory would predict.
More formally, suppose that all employees were paid an amount
which depended on the value of their marginal productivity and on the
share of their on-the-job-training which they had financed:
10) Y = [1 - f(Xl)]P,
where Y represents an employee's wage, P represents the value of the
employee's marginal product, Xl represents experience, and f is a function
of Xl such that 0 ~ f(Xl ) ~ 1 and f'(Xl ) < O. The stated condition on
the sign of the derivative of f is hypothesized to result from older
employees having financed a larger proportion of their -
on-the-job training than younger employees. Taking the logarithm of both
sides of equation 10 and assuming that f(Xl ) is small enough such that
In[l + f(X1)] ~ f(Xl ) we get:
11) In(Y) ~ -f(Xl ) + In(P) ,
which implies that, holding productivity constant, older employees should
be paid more than younger employees.
While the preceding story provides a possible (although somewhat
implausible) explanation of the cross sectional results presented in
Medoff, in Medoff and Abraham, and thus far in this paper,29it could not
explain a finding that over time the relative earnings of individual
managers and professionals tended to rise while the relative performance
of those same managers and professionals failed to keep pace or even
tended to fall. We have been able to devise no reasonable human capital
explanation for the findings presented in Table 5.
The Table 5 results were generated under the assumption that both












Movement in Performance Ratings and Rllnkin?,s Over Time for Individuals Staying in the Same Grade -
Fraction of Those Change in Within- Change in Salary Change in Ranking Change in Salary
Active 1972 to Grade Performance Variable Corres- Decile Variab1e /c Variable Corres-
Relevant End Year Rating Percentile ponding to Perform- for Stayers - ponding to Ranking
Not Changing Gr,de Variable for,c
atice Rating Per- Decile variab1~c
During Period ~ _ Stayers - centi1e variab1e/c for Stayers -
for Stayers -
.789 .008 .059 -.005 .061
(.005) (.005) (.006) (.005)
.608 .005 .108 -.012 .108
(.009) (.009) (.I:no) (.008)
.513 -.004 .130 -.024 .137
(.012) (.012) (.013) (.012)
.393· -.019 .156 -.041 .157
(.016) (.016) (.017) (.015)
Fraction of Those. Change in Within- Change in Salary Change in Ranking Chan~e in Salary
Active 1972 to Grade Performance Variable Corres- Decile Variab1,c Variable Corres-
1976 Not Changing/
b
Rating Percentile ponding to Perform- for Stayers - ponding to Ranking
Grade 1972 to 1976 - Variable for/c ance Rating Percen- Decile Variable/
Stayers - tile variable/for for Stayers ~
Stayers ~
.393 -.005 .044 -.021 .045
COlO) (.011) (.012) (.009)
.393 -.012 .088 -.030 .087
(.013) (.012) (.015) (.012)
.393 -.018 .112 -.')32 .115
(.015) (.014) (.016) (.014)
.393 -.019 .156 -.041 .157
(.016) (.016) (.017) (.015)
Notes: /~ Standard errors are enclosed in parentheses below change estimates.
I~ The number of population members active throughout the relevant period was 7.547 for 1972-1973. 6.603
for 1972-1974. 6.170 for 1972-1975 and 5.689 for 1972-1976.
I~ The procedure used to construct the performance rating percentile variables. ranking decile variables
and two sets of corresponding salary variables on which the change estimates are based is detailed in
Section II. The reported change estimates were obtained by regressing the change in the relevant va-
riable for each stayer on a constant. change in the square of company service and change in the square




percentile in any year could be written as functions of observable and
unobservable characteristics of each managerial and professional employee:
2





represents within-grade performance percentile as of time t,
St represents within-grade salary percentile as of time t, Xlt represents
length of company service as of time t, X2 represents a vector containing
~ t
pre-company experience and its square, educational attainment dummies,
region dummies and grade level dummies for period t, A represent un-
captured individual differences in factors such as innate ability which
affect relative performance and relative earnings, and the S's and e's
represent parameters to be estimated. Given the assumed model, both
within-grade performance percentile and within-grade salary percentile
should move in a predictable fashion with the passage of time:
and
for those individuals not changing their educational status, region or grade
level. Note that differencing eliminates A, so that estimation of equations
14 and 15 should yield estimates (applicable to the population not changing
educational status, region or grade level over the relevant time period)
of the effect of the passage of time on both within-grade performance per-
centile and within-grade salary percentile which are not biased by uncaptured
individual-specific differences that affect performance and earnings.30
The results presented in Table 5 were derived from regressions of change45
in within-grade performance percentile and change in within-grade salary
percentile on a constant term plus change in the square of company service.
The major conclusion which emerges .from the Table 5 analysis is that
the passage of time affects within-grade performance percentile much
differently than it affects within-grade salary percentile. Both the
results at the top of the page (based on four different samples including
everyone in the original populations not changing grade between 1972 and
1973, 1972 and 1974, 1972 and 1975, and 1972 and 1976, respectively) and
the results at the bottom of the page (based on one sample including
everyone in the original populationsnot changing grade between 1972 and
1976) imply that (for those satisfying the relevant sample selection
criteria and with the appropriate sample mean company tenure) within-grade
rating percentile does not change significantly with the passage of from
one to four years' time. For both sample selection alternatives, the
predicted changes at the mean level of company service in within-grade
ranking percentile were insignificantly negative for the one and two year
periods, more substantially and significantly negative for the three and
four year periods. It is interesting that for sample members with mean
company tenure the predicted change over time in within-grade rating
percentile is indistinguishable from zero while the predicted change over
time in within-grade ranking percentile (at least for the three and four
year periods) is substantially and significantly negative; this is the
opposite of what an argument that managers and professionals might become
more productive over time without moving into higher rating categories
would lead one to expect.
The salary percentile results contrast sharply with the performance
percentile results; for both sample selection alternatives, and for both
salary percentile variables (one ana1agous to the rating percentile variable
and the other analogous to the ranking percentile variable) at the mean level of46
company service, the passage of one, two, three or four years time is
associated with a substantial and significant upward movement in relative
within-grade salary position. With time, then, for those persons not
changing grade, relative within-grade performance appears to remain
stable or deteriorate while relative within-grade salary rises substantially.
Thus, the Table 5 results imply that for many employees in our
economy, the growth in relative earnings with the passage of time cannot
be explained by the growth of relative performance, contrary to the human
capital explanation of the experience earnings profile. Moreover,
they suggest that with additional labor force experience the relative
performance of a substantial number of employees actually deteriorates.3l47
IV Conclusions and Directions
This study has presented the results of an experiment designed to
test whether or not all but a small fraction of experience-earnings
differentials can be explained by experience-productivity differentials.
Under our assumption that supervisors' ratings of their subordinates
adequately reflect the subordinates' true relative productivity in the year
of appraisal, the answer is clearly no, at least for white male managerial
and professional employees in the four major corporations we have studied.
Our primary finding is based on both cross-sectional and longitudinal
personnel data files, which include performance ratings done under a number
of different procedures, and in one case, a ranking by current performance
of similarly-situated employees done collectively by all supervisors who
have observed the employees' work during the relevant year. Our key
assumption concerning performance ratings is supported by a seemingly
substantial amount of institutional and econometric evidence presented
above and in Medoff and Medoff and Abraham.
If our experimental design is taken as sound and our data as adequate
for their task, we must begin to formalize theories of experience-earnings
differentials that do not have experience-productivity differentials at
their heart, design experiments under which those theories might be falsified,
and gather the data required for this experimentation. It is our belief
that major steps in these directions can be taken through interaction
with those who formulate company compensation policies
and with those affected by these policies. In particular,
interviews with the members of top management who are responsible for
the outlines of a company's pay practices should be conducted; discussions
with supervisors about how they determine the proper salaries for their48
subordinates should be initiated; and the attitudes of employees toward
different compensation schemes (e.g., relative earnings reflect relative
productivity versus relative service) should be assessed. Moreover,
we should seek data which would permit analysis of the impact of changes
in the nature of firms' compensation practices on things such as productivity,
quits, ability to attract new hires, absenteeism, and job satisfaction.
Unlike physical scientists, economists typically are not involved
in the collection of the data they use, and unlike other social scientists,
economists generally avoid having contact with their units of observation.
As a result, the proper data for testing numerous important beliefs
that many economists hold have not been gathered and the knowledge of those
who are likely to really know what is going on has been ignored. We
feel that this most certainly has been true in the case of the belief
that experience-earnings differentials can be explained by experience-
productivity differentials. Thus, we contend that our evidence stands at




By rated performance we mean an overall evaluation of how well an employee
is currently fulfilling the requirements of his job, where this evaluation
takes the form of a performance rating assigned by the employee's
immediate supervisor. We have assumed that the relative rated performance
of employees performing comparable work conveys information regarding
the relative current productivity of those same employees. This key
assumption is defended in Medoff, in Medoff and Abraham and later in
this study.
2The human capital model of investment in on-the-job training is laid
out in detail in Becker, pp. 16-37.
3Mincer has seniority provisions under collective baragining agreements
in mind when he makes this statement, but his logic applies equally
well to other institutional settings.
4For good general discussions of performance ratings and further references,
see Barrett, Bass and Barrett, Landy and Trumbo, and McCormick and Tiffin.
5Research assessing cross-rater variation in performance ratings includes
Borman and Whitlock. Lawler refers to Whitlock's work and asserts that
"other studies have shown that raters tend to agree upon the weight to
be assigned to•••• different behavior specimens; thus inter-rater
reliability is possible" (p. 371) but unfortunately does not specify
what other studies he has in mind.
6The existence of variation in supervisor's rating standards would imply
that performance ratings captured true performance with some measurement
error:
1) P = p* + v,50
where P represents rated performance, p* represents true performance and
v represents the measurement error. If employees with different observed
characteristics were not systematically paired with supervisors applying
different sets of rating standards, the measurement error would be of the
classical variety (E(v/observed characteristics) = 0). Our semilog
earnings function with grade level controls and performance controls can
be represented:
2) In(y) = a + SX + yG + oP + ~,
where y represents annual salary, the vector X captures educational
attainment, pre-company experience, and company service, G is a vector
of grade level dummies, a, S, y and 0 represent parameters to be estimated,
and € represents the equation error. The presence of classical measurement
A
error in our performance variable would cause downward bias in 0 and also
downward bias in the estimated return to both pre-company experience and
company service resulting from the negative partial correlation between
observed performance and each of those labor force experience variables.
Hence, if the measurement error in the performance variable v·~ere re(1UCe0
A
causing 0 to increase, the estimated pre-company experience and company
service coefficients would also increase. For measurement error in the
performance variable to be a plausible explanation of why the experience
coefficients in our In(earnings) regressions did not move towards zero
when performance controls were introduced, the arguable bias in the
experieace coefficients would have had to have been in the opposite
direction.
Classical measurement error in an ordinary least squares dependent
variable would cause no bias in estimated ordinary least squares
coefficients. It thus seems highly unlikely that measurement error in
the performance variable used to create the categories employed on the
left hand side of our multinomial logit performance equation could51
have caused any substantial bias in our multinomial 10git coefficient
estimates.
7Two studies of blue collar workers, one by Rothe and one by Rundquist
and Bittner, contain some evidence that the ratings of long service
laundry workers and container inspectors tend to be inflated. A study
by Ferguson of ratings given to assistant life insurance sales managers
and another study by Stockford and Bisse1 of ratings given to first line
supervisors at a manufacturing plant suggest that superiors tend to be
more lenient in rating those whom they have known for a longer period
of time.
8One might be tempted to look at the change over time in the hourly
production of individual piece rate workers as a source of direct
evidence regarding the shape of the experience-productivity profile
among such workers. To the extent that factors other than a worker's
experience which might affect productivity change with the passage of time
(for example, workers might typically be given first claim on materials during
periods of shortage or be allowed to choose better machines as they accrued
more seniority) such an experiment would produce misleading results.
9promotion equations with education dummies, pre-company experience
and its square, company service ~nd its square, region dummies and
grade level dummies on the right hand side were estimated using data
from one of the company files analyzed in Medoff and Abraham. The
results implied that, for a person with sample mean characteristics
as of July 1, 1974, an additional year of either pre-company experience
or company service was associated with a 5 percent higher probability
of receiving a promotion between July 1, 1975 and July 1, 1977, and that,
for a person with sample mean characteristics as of July 1, 1976,52
and additional year of either pre-company experience or company service
was associated with a 6 percent. higher probability of receiving a promotion
between July 1, 1976 and July 1, 1977.
10The only imputed 1972 information used in the analysis presented in
Section III was grade level and salary. The 1972 grade level imputation
rested on the assumption that no Company C employee moved down in grade
level or moved up more than one grade level between year-end 1972 and
year-end 1973. Fewer than 5 percent of those included in both our 1973
and our 1974 populations moved down in grade level or moved up more than
one grade level between year-end 1973 and year-end 1974. The 1972 salary
imputation rested on the assumption that the two salary increases recorded
for each Company C employee as of year-end 1973 captured all salary
changes made during calendar year 1973. Beginning in 1975, as many as
. i
six salary increases were recorded for each employee. Fewer than 3 percent
of those included in both our 1974 and our 1975 populations received more
than two salaryincreases during calendar year 1975 and somewhat more than
1 percent of those included in both our 1975 and our 1976 populations
received more than two salary increases during calendar year 1975. Thus,
the assumptions made in order to construct the required fix on each employee's
year-end 1972 status do not appear to have been unreasonable.
11It should be noted that grade level was not adjusted for those employees
who changed grade level between year-end 1972 and year-end 1973 and
also between June 30, 1972 and year-end 1972. Just over 1 percent
of those included in both our 1973 arid our 1974 populations changed grade
level between year-end 1973 and year-end 1974 and also changed grade level
between June 30, 1973 and year-end 1973. Adjusting the recorded grade
level of those who changed grade during the last six months of a year by53
subtracting one from end-of-year grade level seemed reasonable in light
of the previously mentioned fact that very few employees moved down in
grade level or up more than one grade level during a typical year.
l2Complete performance information consisted of the employee's performance
rating, the employee's rank among a group of his peers and the number
of people in the group the employee was included in for ranking purposes.
Employees with a rank group size of one were excluded from our populations;
in 1976, this exclusion reduced the size of our population by approximately
one tenth of 1 percent. The median rank group size in the 1976 population
we used for analysis was 46.
~3The Northeast region comprises Connecticut, Maine, Massachusetts, New
Hampshire, New Jersey, New York, Pennsylvania, Rhode Island and Vermont;
the North Central region Illinois, Indiana, Iowa, Kansas, Michigan,
Minnesota, Missouri, Nebraska, North Dakota, Ohio, South Dakota, and
Wisconsin; the South region Alabama, Arkansas, Delaware, District of
Columbia, Florida, Georgia, Kentucky, Louisiana, Maryland, Mississippi,
North Carolina, Oklahoma, South Carolina, Tennessee, Texas, Virginia
and West Virginia; and the West region Arizona, California, Colorado,
Idaho, Montana, Nevada, New Mexico, Oregon, Utah and Washington.
l4The list of employees normally includes only persons in the same grade
level, but may include persons in several adjacent grade levels if such
broader coverage is needed in order to obtain a reasonably sized comparison
group within any division.
l5Straightforward calculations show that for a person with the mean number
of years of pre-company experience, the within-grade return to an additional
year of pre-company experience is roughly three times as large as the
total return to that same year of pre-company experience. This implies that,
all else'equal, the additional year of pre-company experience tends to be54
associated with holding a job in a lower grade level than would otherwise
be predicted.
l6For an excellent discussion of omitted variable bias, see Appendix C in
Griliches and Ringstad.
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The Table 1 results imply the existence of a substantial and significant
total rettivn to education among managers and professionals at Company C,
most of which is captured by the introduction of grade level dummies into
the In(earnings) regression; only 20 percent of the earnings differential
between non-high school graduates and bachelors degree holders, 7
percent of the differential between high school graduates and bachelors
degree holders, 24 perdent of the differential between masters degree
holders and bachelors degree holders, and 22 percent of the differential
between doctorates and bachelor~ degree holders remains uncaptured by
the grade level dummies. The estimated return to education in the equation
with grade level controls does not move towards zero when first crude
u
and then finer performance controls are introduced which suggests that
this return cannot be explained by within-grade differences in rated
performance.
l~he results presented in equations 2 through 5 of Table 1 are not true
within-grade results since the specification used permits only the
regression intercept and not the coefficients on the education,
experience, performance and region variables to vary across grades.
True within-grade equations comparable to regressions 2 through 5
were estimated separately for each of the twelve grade levels represented
in our population. In all twelve cases, having either an additional
year of pre-company experience or an additional year of company service
beyond the overall mean amount for the relevant variable was associated'
with a reasonably sized positive increment to earnings; in ,no case did55
the estimated within-grade return to experience move towards zero when
performance controls were introduced.
19Appendix C to Griliches and Ringstad discusses omitted variable bias.
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The difference Sl~0l is a biased estimator of Sl-0l if it is not true that
unobserved ability affects relative performance in the same way as it affects
relative salary so thatS3 and 03 are not equal. While the existence of
a divergence between Sl and 01 thus does not necessarily imply that
experience affects performance differently than it affects salary,
it does imply that either experience or ability affects relative performance
differently than relative salary and hence calls into question theories which
explain all earnings differentials in terms of productivity differentials.
2lControlling for labor force experience and grade level, education has a
pronounced positive effect on within-grade salary percentile and a
pronounced negative effect on within-grade performance percentile.
Both the estimated positive effect of education on salary percentile
and the estimated negative effect of education on performance percentile
are stronger when finer measures of the dependent variables are employed.
22The equations presented in Table 2 are not really within-grade regressions
since the inclusion of a set of grade dummies among the independent
variables only permits a different intercept and not different effects
of education, experience and region across grade levels. Separate
within-grade equations comparable to the six regressions in Table 2
were estimated for each of the twelve grade levels represented in 0ur
population. In each of the twelve cases, the regression coefficients
implied that, using any of the three sets of dependent variables, for a
person with the overall mean number of years of both pre-company experience
and company service, an additional year of either pre-company experience56
or company service was associated with lower relative within-grade
performance but higher relative within-grade salary.
23The promotion probability results were obtained using a maximum likelihood
logit procedure. The logit model is discussed in Ner10ve and Press.
24The high mean percentage salary increase observed daring calendar year
1974 (roughly 19 percent) resulted from the granting of two across-the-
board cost-of-1iving increases totalling approximately 12 percent during
that year. Very similar results were obtained when percentage salary
increase during calendar year 1975 (having a mean of 9 points) was regressed
on year-end 1974 independent variables.
25Resu1ts based on one of the data sets analyzed in Medoff and Abraham
indicating that more experienced employees in any grade level were likely
to be promoted than similarly-educated less-experienced employees in the
same grade level are discussed in footnote 8. Given the zero or negative
partial correlation between rated performance and labor force experience
at Company C, the promotion equation results presented in Table 3 imply
that, controlling for education, region, and grade level but not for
rated performance, more experienced Company C employees are significantly
less likely to be promoted than similarly educated but less experienced
CompanyC employees. The coefficient estimates obtained from equations
of the same form as those in Table 3 but without performance rating
controls implied that, for a person with the appropriate sample mean
characteristics as of year-end 1973, an additional year of pre-company
experience was associated with a 5 percent lower probability of receiving
a promotion between year-end 1973 and year-end 1974 and with a 4 percent
lower probability of receiving a promotion between year-end 1974 and
year-end 1977; an additional year of company service was associated with
a 4 percent lower probability of receiving a promotion between year-end
1973 and year-end 1974 and with a 4 percent lower probability of57
receiving a promotion between year-end 1974 and year-end 1977.
26Equations 1 through 3 were estimated using the same maximum likelihood
logit procedure as was used to estimate the promotion equations presented
in Table 3.




where L(0) is the log likelihood of the unrestricted model and L(0 ) is
the log likelihood of the restricted model.
28Other promotion and 1n(earnings equations were estimated using a set of
dummy variables capturing each employee's potential grade level rather
than 1n(mean annual salary as of December 1976 in employee's potential
grade level) as in the equations reported. Results very similar to those
included in Table 4 were obtained. The results actually presented were
chosen for expositional reasons.
29Very large decreases over time in the share of on-the-job training costs
borne by employees would be required if the explanation just offered
were to account for the cross sectional results we obtained. There
seems to be no good reason to believe that changes in the necessary
direction and of the necessary magnitude have occurred.
300ne cannot draw inferences regarding absolute change over time in either
performance or earnings based on observed change over time in either
within-grade performance percentile or within-grade salary percentile,
since there are likely to be shifts over time in the underlying within-grade
productivity and earnings distributions on which the performance and
salary percentile measures are based. However, it seems likely that any58
major shifts in the underlying within-grade productivity and earnings
distributions would occur slowly.
3lAs explained in the text, the change in performance percentile and the
change in salary percentile figures presented in Table 5 were predicted
values derived from equations estimated with change in percentile position
as the dependent variable and a constant term plus change in the square
of company service on the right hand side. Change in educational status
dummies and change in region dummies were not included in the prediction
equation because we did not really know educational status and region
as of year-end 1972. Equations based on 1973 through 1976 data with
change in education dummies and change in region dummies included as
explanatory variables produced results very similar to those reported
in Table 5.59
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